cannabisnews.com: Court Says Judges May Stiffen Penalties 










  Court Says Judges May Stiffen Penalties 

Posted by CN Staff on June 24, 2002 at 21:29:58 PT
By Charles Lane, Washington Post Staff Writer 
Source: Washington Post  

A divided Supreme Court ruled yesterday that judges may stiffen the minimum sentences defendants receive even in cases where the jury did not find the facts upon which the tougher penalty is based, a decision that upholds thousands of sentences imposed under state and federal "mandatory minimum" laws around the country.Narrowing the impact of a landmark 2000 ruling that affirmed the right to a jury trial on any fact that could increase a maximum sentence, five justices voted to uphold a North Carolina drug dealer's sentence under a federal drug law that assigns more prison time for crimes committed with a gun.
The law is constitutional, they said, because it could be read as separating sentencing "factors," which may be determined by a judge, from elements of the crime itself, which must be found by the jury.However, only four of the five -- Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, all conservatives -- endorsed the broader claim that, as Kennedy put it in an opinion announcing the ruling, there is a "fundamental distinction" between setting the minimum punishment someone must face within a range defined by law and finding special factors that would enhance a sentence beyond the prescribed maximum. For this reason, Kennedy wrote, "judicial factfinding . . . does not implicate" the constitutional right enshrined in the 2000 case, Apprendi v. New Jersey.Justice Stephen G. Breyer, a liberal and the fifth vote, balked at that holding, however, suggesting instead that his concern was the "adverse practical, as well as legal, consequences" that would flow from applying Apprendi to the minimum-sentencing process.Four justices -- liberals John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg and conservative Clarence Thomas -- dissented. Writing for the group, Thomas said "the Court's holding today . . . rests on either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the very principles that animated Apprendi just two years ago."The case was decided on the same day that the court appeared to expand the logic of Apprendi in a separate case, Ring v. Arizona, No. 01-488, by ruling that states cannot leave it to judges alone to decide facts that could make the difference between a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death. As such, the ruling showed that the court is still wrestling with the often unforeseen implications of Apprendi, in ways that defy ideological categorization -- and that are not always easy to reconcile, even for the justices themselves.The swing voter in yesterday's case, Harris v. U.S., No. 00-10666, appeared to have been Scalia. Of the five justices who voted for the result, four -- Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer -- did not vote for Apprendi. All four of yesterday's dissenters did support Apprendi.That leaves Scalia, who supported Apprendi originally, and voted yesterday to apply it in the death penalty case. In that one, Ring v. Arizona, he supplied a separate concurring opinion explaining his vote. In Harris, however, which limits Apprendi's impact, Scalia did not write separately.Kennedy, too, voted to apply Apprendi in the death penalty case but not in Harris. He accounted for this partly in his opinion in Harris, with its distinction between minimum and maximum sentences, but also in a brief concurrence in Ring, which suggested that, while he accepted Apprendi as the law of the land, it should not be "extended without caution," for fear of upsetting "the States' settled expectations."For his part, Breyer decided the death penalty case on the basis that it was not about the right to a jury trial at all, but rather about the need to prevent "cruel and unusual punishment," which is prohibited by a different amendment of the Bill of Rights. That would avoid any conflict between his vote in favor of defendants in Ring and his vote against them in Harris.Mandatory minimums were adopted by Congress and the states in response to public anger at lenient sentences meted out by judges under previous law. However, mandatory minimums have themselves sparked debate, as many people have been imprisoned for long periods for relatively minor offenses such as possession or sale of a small quantity of drugs.The intensity of that debate was reflected within Breyer's opinion. In worrying about the practical impact of throwing out judge-determined minimum sentences, he echoed the concerns expressed to the court by the Bush administration and a group of 25 states, which warned of the burden on law enforcement that would result.At the same time, Breyer devoted much of his three-page opinion to describing his concerns about the unfairness and ineffectiveness of mandatory minimums.Applying Apprendi to the mandatory minimum context would be counterproductive, Breyer argued, because prosecutors would simply adjust the charges they file to guarantee a harsh sentence anyway. That would enhance the prosecutors' power, not that of jurors, Breyer wrote.This argument sounded the same themes as the brief by Families Against Mandatory Minimums, which represents 24,000 inmates or family members of inmates. It said mandatory minimums are "expensive and inefficient, perpetuate unwarranted and unjust sentencing disparities, and transfer the sentencing function unwisely from the judiciary to the prosecution."Even Kennedy's opinion noted that such "criticisms might be sound," but added that they would apply whether a judge or a jury meted out a mandatory minimum sentence.The case decided yesterday arose from the prosecution and conviction of North Carolina pawnshop owner William Joseph Harris, who was sentenced by a federal judge to seven years for selling drugs, after the judge, employing a lower standard of proof than a jury would have, found that Harris had "brandished" a gun during the drug deal.The government's indictment did not charge Harris with brandishing the weapon. That evidence was introduced at the sentencing hearing.Under the relevant federal statute, Harris could have received a minimum sentence of five years without the finding that he brandished the weapon.Note: 5-to-4 Ruling Upholds 'Mandatory Minimum' Sentencing Practices. Source: Washington Post (DC)Author: Charles Lane, Washington Post Staff WriterPublished: Tuesday, June 25, 2002; Page A05Copyright: 2002 The Washington Post Company Contact: letterstoed washpost.comWebsite: http://www.washingtonpost.com Related Articles:Tougher Sentences for Crimes Involving Guns http://cannabisnews.com/news/thread13214.shtmlPlea Bargainers Do Not Have Right to More Evidence http://cannabisnews.com/news/thread13213.shtmlHigh Court Rules on Defendants' Rights http://cannabisnews.com/news/thread13211.shtml

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Comment #2 posted by Zero_G on June 25, 2002 at 14:01:40 PT
Judicial function
It was traditionally the function of the jury to decide matters of fact, (guilt or innocence) and law (should this be an actionable offence).The latter, while not technically invalid, has been removed from judicial instruction to juries since the late 1890's.Before mandatory minimums, Judges set sentences. 
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Comment #1 posted by freedom fighter on June 24, 2002 at 22:02:24 PT
Confusion abound!
I thought it is the jury's job to decide whatever fate they may give out to the defendant. NOT THE JUDGES! It's crazy to get two different version from 9 black robed vermins in a day.ff
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